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ABSTRACT
Between 1946 and 1976, the European powers grantedindependence to all of their large
colonies in Africa and Southeast Asia. Thispaper attempts to provide an economic explanation
for this remarkable ending to the era of colonialism. The maintheoretical innovation is to
consider the effect of population increase on the allocation of timeby the indigenous population
between productive and subversive activities. Theanalysis suggests that the increase in
population during the colonial period increased the potential return toextralegal appropriation of
the profits of colonial companies until the colonies becamea net burden on the metropolitan
governments. The analysis also suggests that there was less subversive activity in colonies in
which the market for indigenous labor was monopsonized becausemonopsonistic employers
internalized the potential negative effect of extralegal appropriationon net profits.
Herschel I. Grossman Murat lyigun
Department of Economics Department of Economics BoxB BoxB
Brown University Brown University
Providence, RI 02912 Providence, RI 02912
and NBERAt the end of World War II, most of Southeast Asiaas well as most of Africa consisted
of European colonies. But, between 1946 and 1976the European metropolitanpowers
granted independence to all of their large colonies in SoutheastAsia and Africa (with the
exception of Southern Rhodesia, which became independent in1981). Is there an economic
explanation for this remarkable series of decisions thatbrought the era of colonialism to
an end?
The large European colonies in Southeast Asia and Africawere similar in important
respects. An important motivation for establishing each of these colonieswas the income
to be earned by exploiting their naturalresources. In most of the colonies the main natural
resource was agricultural land, but in some colonies (forexample, Northern Rhodesia and
the Belgian Congo) extractable mineralswere more important. Moreover, in all of the
colonies the exploitation of natural resources involvedthe employment of large amounts
of indigenous labor. Perhaps most interestingly, in allof the large European colonies in
Southeast Asia and Africa the indigenouspopulation and, hence, the potential supply of
indigenous labor apparently increased substantiallyduring the colonial period.'
There were also important differencesamong the large European colonies in South-
east Asia and Africa. In some colonies,especially colonies like Algeria, the Dutch East
Indies, French Indochina, British India, and Kenya, in whichproduction was carried out
on many relatively small farms, the market for indigenous laborseems to have been com-
'Holland (1985) refers to "a population explosion.., almosteverywhere in the colonial world." For all of
Africa Matas (1973) estimates that total population, whichapparently was not growing prior to the colonial
period, increased by more than 150 percent from 1900 to 1971. In individual Africancolonies, Can-Saunders (1936) and Clark (1967) estimate that the population of Algeria increasedby about 90 percent from 1901 to
1931 and by about 92 percent from 1920 to 1962, the Colonial Office(1964) reports that population growth began in Kenya in the 1920's and readied an annual rate of threepercent by the 1960's, Thompson and
AdloIt (1957) report estimated population increase in Fench SubsaharanAfrica of 37 percent from 1926 to
1951, and Allen (1964) estimates that the population of Northern Rhodesiagrew at an annual rate of about
2.5 percent from 1923 to 1943. For all of Asia, Matras estimates thattotal population increased by about 146 percent from 1900 to 1971. In individual Asian colonies,Nitisastro (1970) estimates that the population
of Java the major island in the Dutch East Indies, increasedby about 90 percent from 1916 to 1960 and
Kumar (1983) estimates that the population of British India increasedby more than 50 percent from 1872 to 1941.
1petitive, whereas in other colonies, like those in French Subsaharan Africa, BritishWest
Africa, Northern Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo, in which one or a fewlarge plantations,
trading companies, or mining companies employed, either directly orindirectly, most of
the indigenous labor, the labor market seems to have beenmonopsonized.2 in addition, in
some colonies, such as Algeria, the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, BritishIndia, and
Kenya, subversive activity by the indigenous population was intense in theperiod before
independence and seems to have played a major role in inducingihemetropolitan power
to grant independence, but in other areas, such as French SubsabaranAfrica, British West
Africa, Northern Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo, subversive activityseems to have pre-
sented only a minor problem for the metropolitanpower. Interestingly, the cases in which
anticolonial subversive activity was intense are alsocases in which the market for indige-
nous labor seems to have been competitive, whereas in the cases in which the labormarket
seems to have been monopsonized subversive activity was not intense.
This paper attempts to provide an economicexplanation for the end of colonialism
in Southeast Asia and Africa. The main theoreticalinnovation is to consider the effect
of population increase on the allocation of timeby the indigenous population between
productive and subversive activities. Among otherquestions, the analysis asks whether
and, if so, how the increase in population during the colonialperiod was a factor in the
process leading to the end of colonialism. The analysis also seeks toexplain the apparent
relation between the structure of the colonial labor marketand the amount of anticolonial
subversive activity.
The Indigenous Population
Consider the following model of a representativecolony. The population of the colony
2These inferences about the structure of labor marketscome from the discussions in Larreg (1916)and Prochaska (1990)onAlgeria, Vlekke (1960) on the Dutch East Indies, Robequain (1944) on FrenchIndochina, Kumar (1983) on British India, van Zwanenberg (1975)on Kenya, Suret-Canale (1971) on French Subsaharan
Africa, Kay (1972) on British West Africa, Thompson and Woodruff(1953) on Northern Rhodesia, a,d
Lemarchand (1964) on the Belgian Congo.
2consists of a large number, N, of identical indigenous families.Theindigenous families
divide their time between productive and subversive activities.The productive activity
is wage employment offered by the colonialcompany or companies that are exploiting the
natural resources of the colony.3 The subversive activity isbanditry or similar forms of
extralegal appropriation of the profits of the colonial company or companies.4
The income of an indigenous family fromwage employment is w, where w is the
wage rate and I is the fraction of its time that this family allocates to wage employment.
The total income of indigenous families from extralegalappropriation is f3Rir, where R
is the total number of units of indigenous naturalresources, lr is the gross profits obtained
from each unit of indigenous natural resources, and /3 is the fraction ofgross profits lost to
extralegal appropkation. This total income from extralegal appropriation is dividedamong
the indigenous families proportionately to the time allocated by eachfamily to extralegal
appropriation. Thus, the income of an indigenous family from extralegalappropriation is
(iRirb/NB, where & is the fraction of its time that this family allocates toextralegal
appropriation and B is the fraction of its time that theaverage family allocates to
extralegal appropriation.5
A natural assumption is that, for /3 < 1, /3 is an increasing function ofNB/B,
3TIIIS model does not consider other employment arrangements, suchas sharecropping, and abstracts
from the possibility of employment in an indigenous sector. Introducing thesecomplications would not
change the qualitative conclusions drawn below.
4An alternative would be to model subversive activity as anattempt to take control of the natural
resources of the colony —thatis, as a direct attempt to drive out the metropolitan power and its colonial
companies —ratherthan as an attempt only to appropriate the current profits of colonial companies. The
main results of the analysis would obtain in this alternative framework as well.
51n this model the allocation of time to extralegal appropriation reducesaggregate output and income
by taking time away from productive activities. But, given aggregate output and income, the totalgain to
indigenous families from extralegal appropriation exactly equals the total loss to colonial companies from
extralegal appropriation. In other words, the analysis abstracts from the possibility that theprocess of
extralegal appropriation destroys output. This possibility would leave the indigenous families with a total
gain that is smaller than the total loss to colonial companies. The analysis also abstracts from the possibility
that, in addition to the income from extralegal appropriation, indigenous families receive a nonpecuniary
benefit because extralegal appropriation advances the cause of independence. This possibility would make
the total gain to indigenous families larger than the total loss to coloniai.eompanies.Introducing these
complications also would not change the main results of the analysis.
3which is the total time that indigenous families allocate to extralegalappropriation per
unit of indigenous natural resources. A simple technology of extralegalappropriation that




where￿ 0. In equation (1) the parameter determines the effectiveness of time
allocated to extralegal appropriation. As long as jI is less thanunity, the larger isthe
larger is both the average and marginal effect of NB/R on j3.° Given equation(1), the
income of an indigenous family from extralegal appropriation, f3Rirb/NB, isequivalent,
for /3<1, to irb.
Each indigenous family takes toandqnr as given and selects £ and ii, subject to
theconstraintL + b =1,to maximize its income i. The above assumptions imply that
i=wt+,rb. (2)
Givenequation (2),theKuhn-Tucker conditions for maximizing i imply
0 forwct
1=[0,1} for w=Ø (3)
1 forw>Ø
and 6 =i—i.Equation (3) indicates, among other things, that each family would allocate
all of its time to one activity only if the return to thatactivity is not smaller than the
return to the other activity and that each family would allocate timeto both activities only
if the returns to both activities are equal. Inequilibrium, because all indigenous families
aTh piecewise.Iinear specification of thetechnology of appropriation simplifies the analysis of the model.
To simplify the aaalysj further we incorporate in theparameter the effect of whatever efforts the
metropolitan government makes to suppress subversive activity in the colony. Inaddition, we implicitly
include expenditure on suppressing subversive activity in thefixed costs of administering the colony that
are introduced below. For a more general model of extralegal appropriationactivity and its suppression, see Grossman (1991).
4are identical, £ is equal to L, which is the fraction of its time that theaverage family
allocates to wage employment, and 6 is equal to B.
A Competitive Labor Market
Suppose that each colonial company exploits one unit of indigenous naturalresources
—forexample, each unit could be a standard sized farm —andthat the number, R, of
such resource units and, hence, the number of colonial companies islarge. With a large
number of employers, the labor market is competitive.
Output per unit of indigenous natural resources, which is the same asoutput per
colonial company, is A/i0,0Cac1,where iiisunits of labor time employed on each
unit of indigenous natural resources and where A is a parameter that reflectsproductivity
as well as the relative price of product produced by the colonial companies. Given this
technology, the gross profits obtained from each unit of indigenous naturalresources, which
is the same as the gross profits of each colonialcompany, are
,r=Aha_wh. (4)
Each company takes the wage rate as given and selects h to maximizelr. This maxi-
mization implies that h satisfies
=Aa
()
Themarket-clearing condition for the labor market is
Rh=NL. (6)
Taken together, equations (4), (5), and (6) imply that the market-clearingwage rate
equals the marginal product of labor and satisfies
Aa - W = (iLL\1—a' (')
and that the resulting gross profits of each colonialcompany are
(8)
5Equations (7) and (8) show that the wage share of output is a and that theprofit share
of output is 1 —a.Total gross profits of the colonial companies are
Rir=(1—a)Y, (9)
where Y =AJP_0(NL)0is the total output of the colonial companies.7 Theprofits of
the colonial companies net of extralegal appropriationare
(1- /3)R7r =(1-fI)(1 -a)Y. (10)
Bysubstituting equations (7) and (8) for wages and profits intoequation (3), which
describes the labor-supply behavior of each indigenousfamily, and equating £ to L, we
can calculate the equilibrium behavior of theaverage indigenous family. Then, substituting
into equations (7) and (10), we can calculate theequilibrium wage rate and the equilibrium
net profits of the colonial companies. Thereare three possible cases depending on the value
of N/fl.
I) If .< then we have to> 7rand indigenous families choose £ =1.
In this case, the population is sufficiently smallthat, even with all time allocated to
wage employment, the wage rate is larger than the return toextralegal appropriation.
Consequently, indigenous families allocate all of their time towage employment. Moreover,
with B =1—L=0,the fraction of profits lost to extralegalappropriation, /3, is also
zero. Accordingly, from equation (7) the equilibriumwage rate is
=
(N/R)'—' (11)
and from equation (10) the net profits of thecolonial companies are
(1 —$)Rir=Rir=A(1
—a)R.'"N°. (12)
TThis setup abstracts from the cost ofany capita] invested by the colonial companies. In another paper,
Grossman & lyigun (1993), we analyze theprofitability of colonial investment.
6Equations (11) and (12) imply that with a small population theequilibrium wage rate is
a decreasing convex function of population and that net profitsare an increasing concave
function of population. In other words, with a smallpopulation the conventional wisdom
is correct that population growth depresseswages and raises profits from the exploitation
of natural resources.
II) If￿ c thenwe have vi =1rand indigenous families choose
L = Inthis case, with a fraction of time allocated towage employment that is
positive, less than unity, and a decreasing function of population, themarginal product
of labor and the wage rate are equal to the return toextralegal appropriation. Moreover,
with B =1—L,we have, from equation (1), /3 =— j-, andboth B and /3
are positive and increasing functions of population. In thiscase, from equation (7) the
equilibrium wage rate is
=(1..S_\i—a (13) * 1—al
andfrom equation (10)thenet profits of the colonial companies are
(1 —$)Rr =i
—— a)N. (14)
Equations (13) and (14) imply that with a larger population theequilibrium wage rate as
well as gross profits become independent of population andact profits are a decreasing
linear function of population. In other words, witha larger population the opportunity to
engage in extralegal appropriative activity overturns the conventional wisdom thatpopu-
lation growth depresses wages and raises profits.
III) If>j-1,thenwe have vi = and indigenous families choose L =a.
Moreover, with B =1—L,we have, from equation (1),/3 =1.In this case, the
population is so large that, in order for the wage rate to equal the return toextralegal ap-
propriation, the indigenous families must allocate enough time to extralegalappropriation
to appropriate all profits. In this case, net profitsare zero.
7Taken together, these three cases imply that, if population ispositive, but not too
large, then the net profits of the colonial firms are positive. Moreover, thehighest net
profits occur at a population such that = j-, which is the largestpopulation for which
no time is allocated to extralegal appropriation. In sum, with a competitive labormarket,
if the indigenous population is small —specifically,if C —thenpopulation
growth increases the profits earned in the colony, but that, if population continues togrow
—specifically,ifreaches —thenfurther population growth generates extralegal
appropriative activity and steadily reduces the net profits earned in the colony.
Suppose that the government of the metropolitan power incurs a positivecost, dl, to
administer this colony and providenecessary infrastructure. Equations (12) and (4) imply
that, if the population of the colony is within.a criticalrange such thatis larger than
but smaller than #fl')[l —f()_0J,then the net profits of the colonial firms
exceed dl. Accordingly, assuming that this criticalrange is not empty, if the criterion
for establishing and maintaining a colony is that themetropolitan government can impose
sufficient taxes on the colonial firms to cover the cost ofadministration and infrastructure,
then this colony will be viable if and only if itspopulation is within this critical range.
If the metropolitan government is willing to subsidizethis colony (for example, because
of strategic geopolitical considerations), then thecritical population range can be larger.
But, as long as the metropblitan government is notwilling to bear the entire cost dl,
the bounds of the critical populationrange are positive and finite. This analysis suggests
that a colony with a competitive labor market anda growing population has a life cycle
in which a period of fallingwages and rising profits is followed by a period of constant
wages, positive and increasing subversive appropriative activity, anddeclining net profits,
until finally, assuming that there is notan offsetting decrease in the ratio c/a, the colony
becomes a net burden on themetropolitan government and is given its independence.S
1The analysis of two related models, in Grossman(1993, 1994), suggests that, it either a tax-financed
wage subsidy or a lasd reform were administratively feasible, then these policies couldreduce the amount
8With independence, sovereignty is transferred toan indigenous government, whichcan
redistribute the profits from the exploitation of indigenousnatural resources either by
taxing or by expropriating the colonial companies.
A Monopsonized Labor Market
Suppose that, instead of R colonial companies each exploitingone unit of indigenous
natural resources, a single colonialcompany exploits all 1? units of indigenous natural
resources. As the only employer of indigenous labor, thiscompany monopsothzes the labor
market.
Assume, for heuristic purposes, that this monopsonist faces thesame technologies
of production and extralegal appropriation as thecompetitive companies. Specifically, for
the monopsonist output per unit of naturalresources is M and ji is the fraction of gross
profits lost to extralegal appropriation. Accordingly, themonopsonist's net profits are
(1 —fl)R1T=(1
— — tv/i), withh = (15)
To maximize (I —/3)1?r,the monopsonist chooses awage rate and an amount
of employment to offer to each andevery indigenous family, subject to the labor.supply
behavior of each indigenous family, as given byequation (3), the dependence of j3 on B,
asgivenbyequation(]j,and L+B =1.Thesolutiontothisproblemistoset w equalto
r and to set I and, hence, L equal to unity. in otherwords, the monopsonist sets the
wage rate such that each indigenous family is indifferent between allocating time towage
employment and to extralegal appropriation and themonopsonist offers the indigenous
families sufficient wage employment to absorb all of their time.
Accordingly, in the monopsonistic equilibrium indigenous families allocateno time
to extralegal appropriation. This property obtains because themonopsothst internalizes
the potential negative effect of extralegal appropriationon net profits. In other words, the
of extralegal appropriation and could prolong temporarily theviability of a colony with a competitive labor market and a growing population.
9monopsonist does not take /9 as given, but rather takes into account thatan increase in
L bothincreases outputand decreases B and, hence, decreases the amount ofprofits
lost toextralegal appropriation.In contrast, eachcompetitiveemployer took L, B, and
/3 as given and considered only the effect of the choice of employmenton output.
Substituting to=ir and L = 1 into equation (15), we can solve for the equilibriun
gross and net profits of the monopsonist, which are
ARNa
l+Øt/R (16)




Equations (16) and (17) imply that both the monopsothsticwage rate and the profits of
the monopsonist are smooth hump-shaped functions ofpopulation and that both functions
have a maximum at a population such that= Inother words, with a small
population, population growth raises profits, but also raiseswages as the monopsonist
equates the wage rate to the potential return to extralegalappropriation. With a larger
population, however, population growth depresses both profits andwages. As population
continues to grow, both profits andwage approach zero asymptotically.
Comparing equation (16) to equations (12) and (14), we see thefollowing: First,
if< thenthe profits of a monopsonist are larger than the totalprofits of
competitive companies. But, as populationgrows, the profits of a monopsonist increase
more slowly than the total profits of competitive companies. Second, ifpopulation grows
until= j-9—,thenboth the profits of a monopsonist and the total profits ofcompetitive
companies are at their highest levels, and they are equal. Third, if population continuesto
grow so that %> thenthe profits of a monopsonist decrease more slowly than the
total net profits of competitive firms and the netprofits of a monopsonist again become
larger than the total net profits of competitive firms. Note,however, that in this case
10the profits of a monopsonist are smaller than the totalgross profits of competitive firms.
With a large population, the larger net profits ofa monopsonist result from the ability of
the monopsonist to internalize the potentialnegative effect of extralegal appropriationon
profits.
Comparing equation (17) to equations (11) and (13), wesee the following: First,
if< then the monopsonistic wage rate is less than thecompetitive wage rate.
But, as population grows, the monopsonisticwage increases, whereas the competitivewage
decreases. Second, if population grows until= then the monopsonisticwage
and the competitive wage become equal. Third, ifpopulation continues to grow so that
>1S..,then the monopsonistic wage decreases andagain becomes less than the com-
petitive wage, which remains constant. Note that witha large population the indigenous
families allocate no time to extralegal appropriation in themonopsonistic equilibrium, but
not in the competitive equilibrium, even though themonopsonistic wage is less than the
competitive wage. The explanation is that the totalgross profits of competitive companies,
but not their net profits, are larger than theprofits of a monopsonist.
Most importantly, equation (16) implies that,similarly to the competitive case, if
the population of the colony is neither too smallnor too large, then the monopsonist's
profits exceed cl?1 the cost of administering andproviding necessary infrastructure for
the colony. Thus, a colony with a monopsonized labormarket and a growing pop ulation
will have a life cycle that is similar to the lifecycle of a colony with a competitive labor
market. Specifically, with either amonopsonized labor market or a competitive labor
market, population growth produces a period of risingprofits followed by a period of
declining profits, until finally the colony becomes a net burdenon the metropolis. But, for
any given level of dl?, or any given level of dl? less the subsidy that themetropolitan
government is willing to provide to the colony, the critical populationrange for which the
colony remains viable is larger with a monopsonized labor market thanwith a competitive
labor market. In addition, with a competitive labor marketthe period of rising profits has
11falling wages arid the period of falling profits has both constant wages and positive and
increasing extralegal appropriative activity, whereas with a monopsonized labor market
wages rise when profits are rising and wages fall when profits are falling and there is no
extralegal appropriative activity.
Summary -
Thispaper has suggested an economic explanation for the decisions of the Euro-
pean metropolitan powers between 1946 and 1976 to grant independence to all of their
large colonies in Southeast Asia and Africa. This explanation emphasizes the substantial
population increase during the colonial period and argues that this increase inpopulation
increased the potential return to extralegal appropriation of theprofits of the colonial
companies. The analysis suggests that a colony with a growing population hasa life cycle
in which population growth produces a period of risingprofits followed, because of the
increasing potential return to extralegal appropriation, by a period of falling netprofits
until the colony becomes a net burden on the metropolitangovernment.
The analysis also distinguished between colonies in which the market forindigenous
labor was competitive and in which subversiveactivity by the indigenous population was
intense prior to independence and colonies in which the labor marketwas monopsonized
and in which subversive activity was not intense. Theanalysis attributes this relaéion
between the structure of the labor market and the amount ofsubversive activity to the
ability of a monopsonist to internalize the potential negative effect ofextralegal appro-
priation on net profits. Although with a monopsonized labor market subversiveactivity
was not intense and the colony remained viable for a larger population,population growth
still depressed net profits and the colony stilleventually became a net burden because
the monopsonist had to keep thewage rate equal to the potential return to extralegal
appropriation.
In most of the colonies in Africa and SoutheastAsia, population increase reflected
12mainly natural population growth, but in some colonies immigration wasimportant. In ei-
ther case, population increase during the colonial period presumablywas not an exogenous
event, but rather a result of changes produced by colonialism itself —specifically,increased
employment opportunities and decreased mortality due to the introduction of European
technologies. Given the relation between population increase and the net profits of colonial
companies, the metropolitan powers at first would have welcomed the population growth
that colonialism induced, but eventually this population growth. became theundoing of
colonialism itself.
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